sketch for a theory of emotions (2)

Unfortunately, when Sartre turns from critiquing the psychological theories of James and Janet and begins describing what a phenomenological theory of emotions might entail, he reveals himself as more prejudiced toward rationalism than his introduction implies. Moreover, replaces the unsatisfactory and mysterious realm of the "unconscious" with the rather deflating category of the "magical."

According to the chapter Outline of a Phenomenological Theory, one of the most significant characteristics of the emotional mode are that it is nonreflective. "Fear does not begin as consciousness of being afraid," (34) but begins with the relationship to a object, with a relationship to the world. Sartre uses the example that one is afraid "of" something; however, we can easily see that we are also angry "at" or in love "with" or charmed "by" something. He calls this the synthesis of the subject and the object in the emotion.

This synthesis partially explains another important point about the emotional mode and that is its immediacy. Unlike the implicitly more distant reflective or rational apprehension of the world, with its "organized complex of utilizable things" that enable us to arrive at a given predetermined end by choosing a series of appropriate tools, the emotional world appears to us as a "nonutilizable whole."

In that case, the categories of the world act immediately upon the consciousness, they are present at no distance (for example, the face that frightens us through the window acts upon us without any means; there is no need for the window to open, for a man to leap into the room or to walk across the floor). And conversely, the consciousness tries to combat these dangers or to modify these objects at no distance and without means, by some absolute, massive modification of the world. This aspect of the world is an entirely coherent one; this is the magical world." (60)

At first glance, these observations follow the promise of the introduction in giving the emotional apprehension of the world its own coherence and its own autonomy. However, when Sartre begins describing the shift from the rational to the emotional mode, he suddenly talks about the "debasing" or "degrading" of consciousness and, in doing so, implicitly ascribes emotions to a more inferior realm of consciousness than the rational, rather than giving it a complementary role. This seems to follow the cultural prejudice in favor of rationalism and with a disregard to the emotional, placing emotionality as a recourse where rationality fails or courage, patience or fortitude are lacking. This is underscored by the ultimately vague nature of the "magical" nature of the emotional world.